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Sovereignty, Power, and Human Rights Treaties: 
An Economic Analysis 
JoonBeom Pae* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
¶1 Given the importance of international human rights law in the legal academy, it is 
surprising that there is a dearth of legal writings dealing with this subject from the 
economic perspective.1  One possible reason for this rarity is the conceptual difficulty 
involved in the incorporation of seemingly individual rights into a model assuming the 
state as a rational entity. 2  However, such a conceptual difficulty can be avoided if we 
regard a state’s control over its human rights policy as a tradable resource; with states 
trading or pooling this resource with each other to maximize their welfare.  Treating state 
sovereignty as tradable property is nothing new in law and economics literature.3  A state 
has autonomy to determine its human rights policy, and such a power can be treated as 
that state’s sovereignty assets.4  States often trade their sovereignty assets, such as human 
rights control, in exchange for economic or political benefits in the international political 
market.5  Sometimes, states pool their assets to define the global or regional standard for 
human rights protection.6 
¶2 When conceptualized as a state’s property, human rights control is subject to the 
same limitations as when private property is “affected with a public interest.”7  Misuse of 
‘human rights control’ property (or human rights abuse) generates negative externalities 
                                                 
 * JoonBeom Pae, 2007 J.D. Candidate, Northwestern University School of Law; B.S. summa cum laude 
in Economics, Seoul National University, 1997.  I would like to thank Professor Michael Davis for his 
valuable comments.   Also, many thanks to Mike Mahany for helping me write this Note in a more clear 
and concise way.  Above all, I dedicate this  to Mihee and Jay who always make me smile and bring me 
happiness. 
 1 “Despite its importance within the legal academy, virtually nothing has been written from a theoretical 
perspective by economically oriented scholars on international human rights law.”  Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of 
Public International Law 58 (Univ. of Chi. Law & Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 216, 2004), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=564383. 
 2 One possible answer is suggested by Professors Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner.  Professor Goldsmith and 
Posner suggest that people’s altruistic interests on the individual level influence government action especially in 
democratic states where voter preference matters.  See JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 109 (2005). 
 3 “The assets traded in this international “market” are not goods or services per se, but assets peculiar to states: 
components of power.”  Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman, Economic Analysis of International Law, 24 YALE J. 
INT’L L. 1, 13 (1999). 
 4 “[T]he unique feature of states is their possession of governmental regulatory authority in the broad sense.”  Id. at 
13-14.  
 5 “In international society, the equivalent of the market is simply the place where states interact to cooperate on 
particular issues – to trade in power – in order to maximize their baskets of preferences.”  Id. at 13. 
 6 International law itself is the process of defining, exchanging, and pooling of states’ regulatory authorities.  See 
id. at 14. 
 7 Property right is no longer juris privati when clothed with public interest.  Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 
182-183 (1961). 
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beyond mere altruistic concerns; such as threats to national security and regional or 
global stability, an influx of refugees, or the spread of disease.8  Since an abusing state 
does not internalize these externalities (which are borne by other states), such human 
rights-abusing policies become relatively cheaper than policies that respect human rights.  
Therefore, given the difficulty of political bargaining regarding human rights issues, 
human rights protection is often under-produced compared to the level that might have 
been achieved without such externalities.9 
¶3 Economic literature suggests two main ways to solve the externality problem.  The 
first is the market, and the second is the institutionalization. 10  The market approach 
enables parties to voluntarily reduce externalities through trade and negotiation. 11  Once 
rights are clearly defined and entitled, externalities with regard to such rights are reduced 
to an economically efficient level as long as the transaction costs are minimal. 12  On the 
other hand, the institutionalization approach monopolizes rights-defining and enforcing 
functions.13  Monopolization can reduce the cost of defining and enforcing rights, making 
the threat of punishment credible to parties who infringe such rights.14  Negative 
externalities are prohibited and reduced by credible coercion from the monopolized 
institution. 15 
¶4 Part I of the following analysis will first lay out theoretical tools and Part II will 
discuss different concepts of sovereignty.  Human rights control will be viewed as a type 
of sovereignty right.  In Part III, the externality assumption will be explained and 
justified; i.e. the assumption that human rights abuses generate economically relevant 
negative externalities.  Based on that assumption, Part IV will discuss the market 
approach, trading human rights control in the international political market, as a solution 
to decreasing negative externalities caused by human rights abuses.  The author will 
argue that the international political market, in which a state’s legal sovereignties are 
traded, is an economically efficient method to solve problems related to human rights 
abuses, provided that the transaction costs in the international political market are 
                                                 
 8 See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Security, Solidarity, and Sovereignty: The Grand Themes of UN Reform, 99 AM. J. 
INT'L L. 619, 624-625 (2005) (“The growing willingness of states to intervene in the domestic affairs of other states 
frequently has a far more self-interested basis. Governments increasingly understand that they often cannot afford to 
look the other way; that fundamental threats to their own security, whether from refugees, terrorists, the potential 
destabilization of an entire region, or a miasma of disease and crime, may well have their origins in conditions once 
thought to be within a state's exclusive domestic jurisdiction.”).   See also William W. Burke-White, Human Rights and 
National Security: The Strategic Correlation, 17  HARV. HUM.  RTS.  J. 249, 250 (2004) (“Evidence from the post-Cold 
War period indicates that states that systemically abuse their own citizens’ human rights are also those most likely to 
engage in aggression.”). 
 9 With the positive transaction cost, externality cannot be reduced to zero.  Note that the existence of an externality 
does not mean that common goods (e.g. human rights protections) are under-supplied than economically efficient level.  
It can be economically efficient even though each party has different effects.  For discussions of externality issues 
resolved through private bargaining, see generally, RONALD HARRY COASE , THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 
(1988).  
 10 There are two main ways to solve externality problems: the first is bilateral persuasion; the second is through 
institutionalization.  See Dunoff & Trachtman, supra note 3, at 14-15. 
 11 Through private bargaining, parties voluntarily internalize any remaining externalities, if such bargaining cost is 
lower than the cost of externality.  See Bruce Yandle, Property Rights or Externality?, in PROPERTY RIGHTS, 
COOPERATION, CONFLICT, AND LAW 259, 270 (Terry L. Anderson & Fred S. McChesney eds., 2003). 
 12 Id.  
 13 See Fred S. McChesney, Government as Definer of Property Rights, Tragedy Exiting the Commons?, in 
PROPERTY RIGHTS, COOPERATION, CONFLICT, AND LAW, supra note 11, at 227, 230-233. 
 14 Id. 
 15 Id. 
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minimal.  Based upon the notion of behavioral sovereignty, part V will discuss how the 
power of the states affects the market analysis by changing the price of sovereignty 
assets; i.e. we will see how state power can change the price of sovereignty assets in the 
international political market.  As will be shown in the analysis, certain sovereignty 
assets held by weaker states cannot be traded in the international political market, 
because such assets have negative values.   
¶5 When the sum of the market price and the transaction costs are higher than the 
costs of violence, states will turn to violence.16  Market analysis combined with a “might 
makes rights”17 limitation shows that the market approach will be pursued only when the 
sum of the market price and the transaction costs are lower than the costs of violence.  
However, the market approach is still an efficient way to solve the problems of human 
rights abuses.  Part VI will show that current human rights treaties have played 
significant roles in reducing the transaction costs, thus making the market approach 
cheaper relative to the costs of violence. 
¶6 Violence is inevitable, since it is often the last resort to enforce a state’s rights with 
respect to international relations.18  As explained in Part V, war sometimes helps facilitate 
the international political market by placing a cap on the negotiation costs.  However, war 
should only be allowed when the problem of opportunistic behavior is minimal. 19  The 
regional enforcement and post-war building activities under UN authority will be 
effective devices to reduce such opportunistic behavior problems, which can facilitate an 
efficient use of force in the future.20 
¶7 Finally, Part VII will consider the institutionalization of human rights regimes as a 
possible alternative to the market approach.  The benefits of institutionalization derive 
from the monopolization of functions such as defining and enforcing human rights.21  
However, the institutionalization is not costless.22  Initial agreement can be difficult due 
to the rent-seeking behavior of states.23  In addition, running such institutions also 
requires political and economic resources.  The agency cost and the information cost 
involved in the institutionalization cannot be ignored.24  Thus, the “nirvana”25 approach 
                                                 
 16 The costs of violence and the costs of negotiation can be compared vis-à-vis each other, because “bargaining for a 
transfer also consumes resources in a way that is not directly productive, [and thus] bargaining differs quantitatively 
rather than qualitatively from fighting.”  See David Haddock, Force, Threat, Negotiation, The Private Enforcement of 
Rights, in PROPERTY RIGHTS, COOPERATION, CONFLICT, AND LAW, supra note 11, at 168, 169. 
 17 “Might makes rights” refers to property rights established by private enforcement.  See John Umbeck, Might 
Makes Rights: A Theory of The Formation And Initial Distribution of Property Rights , 19 ECON. INQUIRY  38 (1981). 
 18 “Violence is usually more costly than a threat of violence.  But the credibility of threat often must be established 
through occasional fits of actual violence.”  See Haddock, supra note 16, at 188. 
 19 The possibility of opportunistic behaviors makes the private enforcement too expensive to be exercised.  See 
DAVID D FRIEDMAN, LAW'S ORDER: WHAT ECONOMICS HAS TO DO WITH LAW 275-276 (2000). 
 20 Avoiding opportunistic behavior problems can be described as a legitimate use of force.  For suggested principles 
regarding legitimate use of force, see U.N. HIGH-LEVEL PANEL ON THREATS, CHALLENGES AND CHANGE, A M ORE 
SECURE WORLD: OUR SHARED RESPONSIBILITY , 62-67 (2004) (hereinafter UN REPORT). 
 21 McChesney, supra note 13.  
 22 Professor McChesney discussed various types of costs incurred in government definition of property rights.  See 
id. at 238-240. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Comparing the ideal norm with an existing imperfect institutional arrangement is called a “nirvana fallacy” by 
Harold Demsetz.  See Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1-2 (1969).  
Economic analysis should be based on a comparative institution approach, which attempts to assess which alternatives 
seem best to minimize the economic problems.  See id.  
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with regard to the institutionalization should be scrutinized and the institutionalization 
should be justified only when the benefits exceed the costs of institutionalization. 
II. THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS CONTROL 
¶8 Under international law, states have a right to autonomy.26  A sovereign state is free 
to independently determine its own policy within the scope of sovereign prerogatives.27 
 “Legal sovereignty implies that each state has the legal competence to, 
inter alia, participate in the international system on an equal footing with 
other states, conclude treaties on the basis of consent, exclude other states 
from interfering in its internal affairs, govern the affairs of its domestic 
territory, and control its borders.”28 
¶9 Liberal theory treats the state in international relations as analogous to the 
individual property holder at the national level.29  The UN charter is sometimes regarded 
as the guardian of this legal sovereignty right.30 
¶10 International legal sovereignty, however, does not guarantee that legitimate 
domestic authorities are able to exercise their sovereignties in a full scale, presiding over 
internal matters with a power to fully enforce their policies.31  Realists may disagree with 
the existence of legal sovereignty, because they believe that “[s]tates interact in an 
environment of anarchy” absent any central government that can enforce the legal 
sovereignty right granted to each state.32  Rather, realists argue that states primarily guard 
their own sovereignty with their own forces.33  In the real world, states are rarely on equal 
footing with respect to international relations.34  Powerful states often set the terms of 
international law favorably to their political interest, and even the decisions made by 
international organizations reflect the states’ underlying power by weighing voting rules 
either directly or indirectly according to the power of such states.35  However, a radical 
view of “power decides everything” also fails to explain why even the weakest states still 
maintain legal sovereignty under the auspices of international law, and why forceful 
annexation or colonization has rarely succeeded since the declaration of the UN charter36 
                                                 
 26 IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 287-295 (6th ed. 2003) (defining the concept of 
sovereignty in general). 
 27 MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 177 (2nd ed. 1993). 
 28 Richard H. Steinberg, Who Is Sovereign?, 40 STAN. J. INT’L L. 329, 329 (2004). 
 29 STEPHEN KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY : ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY  14 (1999). 
 30 JANIS, supra note 27, at 178-179.  
 31 KRASNER, supra note 29, at 36-42, 220-238. 
 32 Kenneth W. Abbott, International Relations Theory, International Law, and The Regime Governing Atrocities in 
International Conflicts , 93 AM. J. INT’L  L. 361, 364 (1999).  
 33 Id. at 364. 
 34 Steinberg, supra note 28, at 333. 
 35 Id.  
 36 Professor Harold Koh persuasively argues that the process of constant interactions can lead to 
compliance, but his theory implicitly assumes the existence of certain norms to which states do comply. See 
Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 Yale L.J. 2599 (1997).  When a 
powerful state can influence the norm itself and make the norm as favorable as possible to its own interest, 
then such a state has no reason not to comply.  Thus, he doesn’t fully explain why a powerful state would 
initially agree to allow legal sovereignty to even the weakest states.  States’ compliance to international 
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¶11 The notion of “behavioral sovereignty” suggested by Professor Steinberg reconciles 
these seemingly opposite views.37  Behavioral sovereignty is the actual extent to which a 
state can exercise, with its own force, its legally granted authority.38  From a behavioral 
perspective, “there are gradations in the extent to which states are able to exercise their 
legal sovereignty. ”39  All states have the legal rights to govern their domestic affairs and 
to control their own borders, but the degree of actual autonomy varies in proportion to the 
distribution of power among those states.40  For example, the United States, arguably the 
most powerful state in the world, exercises the full extent of its legal right to autonomy 
(or, arguably, more than what it is legally allowed, even infringing on the legal 
sovereignty of others), while other weaker states like “Burundi, Columbia, Venezuela, 
Haiti, Liberia, Peru, Rwanda, Uganda, and several other states have had substantial 
swaths of territory in the hands of rebels or lawless gangs in the last decades.”41  Thus, 
one can say that the United States’ behavioral sovereignty is greater than its legal 
sovereignty, while weaker states exercise behavioral sovereignties which are less than 
what they are legally entitled to under current international law.  In an extreme example, 
one state can have behavioral sovereignty with no legal sovereignty.  Palestine, for 
example, is not legally an independent state, but, for all practical purposes, it exercises 
behavioral sovereignty over its people and territory. 42  On the other hand, a government 
in exile has only legal sovereignty without any power to exercise behavioral 
sovereignty. 43  
¶12 These two sovereignty concepts mutually constitute each other.  For example, when 
a state effectively controls certain territory for a long time without any legal rights, 
international law bestows upon the state a right of legal sovereignty over the territory. 44  
Likewise, when insurgents have taken and controlled a substantial territory by armed 
rebellion, international law sometimes grants the insurgents a right to self-determination, 
which is a type of legal sovereignty. 45  Thus, a behavioral sovereignty can develop into a 
                                                                                                                                                 
norms can also be explained by the game theory.  Cooperation (or tit for tat) is often the best strategy in an 
“indefinite games” situation.  See RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE 203-233 (1989).  But this 
analysis also assumes that the players initially have similar powers to allow retaliation.  When a state is 
powerful enough to make the other state’s retaliation unlikely, there can’t be an indefinite game at the first 
place.  
 37 See Steinberg, supra note 28.  
 38 Id. at 329. 
 39 Id. at 340. 
 40 Id. at 331-332. 
 41 Id. at 332, 337. 
 42 Despite of a unilateral declaration of a State of Palestine, “[t]he proclaimed ‘State of Palestine’ is not and has 
never actually been an independent state, as it has never had sovereignty over any territory in history.”  Wikipedia, 
State of Palestine, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/State_of_Palestine. 
 43 “A government in exile is a political group that claims to be a country's legitimate government, but for various 
reasons is unable to exercise its legal power,”  Wikipedia, Government in exile, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Government_in_exile. 
 44 Effective control doctrine sometimes gives a state the right to claim sovereignty over the controlled area without 
any initial entitlement of legal sovereignty.  See Island of Palmas (U.S. v. Neth.), Hague Ct. Rep. 2d (Scott) 83 (Perm. 
Ct. Arb. 1911).  
 45 “[T]he creation of Bangladesh, the breakup of key parts of the former Soviet Union, and the breakup of the 
Yugoslavia” are examples where insurgents’ control has arguably developed into a legal sovereignty.  Michael Davis, 
Where World-Views Collide: Sovereignty and Intervention in an Age of Crisis and Terror 24-25 (Mar. 17, 2005) 
(unpublished colloquium paper, on file with the Harvard Law School Workshop on International Law: A Seminar on 
New Scholarship).  
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legal sovereignty and legal sovereignty can be taken away when the lack of behavioral 
sovereignty is persistent. 
¶13  However, legal sovereignty and behavioral sovereignty are two separate concepts, 
even though they are mutually constitutive.  Collapsing those two concepts into one can 
lead us to a conclusion either too idealistic or too realistic.46  Later on in this discussion, 
the concept of legal sovereignty will be used to analyze the efficient solution for human 
rights protection, while the behavioral sovereignty acts as a restraint on that analysis.  
Ignoring one or the other may result in inefficient or unfeasible policies.   
III. EXTERNALITIES AND THE UNDERSUPPLY OF HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION  
¶14 The UN Charter prohibits the threat or use of force against the autonomy of other 
states, except in self-defense and internationally sanctioned reactions to threats to peace.47  
Abhorrence of war is so great that the international community often fails to allow 
military actions even when humanitarian intervention is necessary. 48  Despite of this lack 
of public enforcement, why does international law try to put some restrictions on the 
state’s discretion to determine its own human rights policy?  The common argument for 
such restrictions is the existence of important negative externalities generated by human 
rights abuses.49   
¶15 When a state makes a decision regarding human rights issues, the state often does 
not consider the possible negative effect on other states.50  Significant abuses of human 
rights may impose threats to people in other states as well as to domestic citizens.51  
Refugees from the abusing state often flow into other states unless certain action is 
taken. 52  Moreover, a state that systemically abuses human rights at home is more likely 
to engage in international aggression that may increase national security concerns in other 
states.53  A state violating the human rights of its own people is able to wage war more 
cheaply, because such a state can “force individuals to fight or support the military 
                                                 
 46 “For example, not distinguishing between legal and behavioral sovereignty may lead powerful states to impose 
international obligations that weaker states cannot fulfill… NGO, for example, will not fully achieve their international 
goals by engaging weaker states to champion causes that powerful states will not.”  Steinberg, supra note 28, at 344-
345. 
 47 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. 
 48 Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary General, lamented about the consequence of the international community’s 
inaction in the face of mass murder in Kosovo and the genocide in Rwanda.  He also warned that the inability of the 
current system to protect common interest and thus increase global welfare might invite other alternatives to replace it.  
See Press Release, Kofi Annan, Implications of International Response To Events in Rwanda, Kosovo Examined by 
Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. GA/9595 (Sept. 20, 1999).  
 49 “An externality occurs when a decision causes costs or benefits to stakeholders other than the person making the 
decision, often, though not necessarily, from the use of common goods (for example, a decision which results in 
pollution of the atmosphere would involve an externality).  In other words, the decision-maker does not bear all of the 
costs or reap all of the gains from his or her action.”  Wikipedia, Externality, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Externality. 
 50 “Transnational externalities involve an action in one country that creates a benefit or cost in another, and there is 
no market compensation.”  See Todd Sandler & Keith Hartley, Economics of Alliances: The Lessons for Collective 
Action, 39  J. ECON. LITERATURE 869, 869 (Sept. 2001).  Transnational externalities have increased significantly due to 
“growing populations, the fragmentation of nations, enhanced monitoring abilities and cumulative industrial pressure 
on the ecosphere.”  See id.    
 51 “[T]he growing willingness of states to intervene in the domestic affairs of other states frequently has a far more 
self-interested basis.”  Slaughter, supra note 8, at 625. 
 52 Id.  
 53 Burke-White, supra note 8, at 250.  
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apparatus in its war-making activities[,]” while on the other hand, human rights 
respecting states must bear a higher political cost of war.54  These negative externalities 
on regional stability seem to be recognized in the European Convention. 55  Moreover, the 
abusing policy enables a state to produce certain goods more cheaply (such as slave labor 
to produce goods for export), which negatively affects the relative competence of 
complying states in the global market.  Therefore, pure altruism is not the only source of 
externalities generated by human rights abuses in other states.56     
¶16 Externalities often lead to either under-protection or over-abuse of human rights, 
because a state bears only a portion of the cost of human rights abuses.57  The remaining 
burden, which will be borne by other states, can be simply ignored in a state’s decision 
making process and therefore the abusing policy becomes cheaper than what it would 
have been if the state had borne the full cost of human rights abuses.  If the transaction 
costs are high enough to make political bargaining impossible between the abusing state 
and the affected state, externalities cannot be reduced through the international political 
market, and become economically irrelevant.58  Thus, human rights protection tends to be 
under-produced compared to the level that might have been achieved without such 
negative externalities.  In othe r words, if the abusing state was required to pay damages 
to the affected states or if the affected states could have stopped such abuses by 
compensating the abusing state, then the actual level of abuses would have been lower 
than the current level. 
IV.  A MARKET APPROACH AS A SOLUTION TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEM 
¶17 Does the current international human rights regime provide a proper solution for 
the problem of the undersupply of human rights protection?  In the following analysis, 
the market approach (or Coasian approach) will be explained first as a solution for 
                                                 
 54 They also value the loss of life highly than states which abuse human rights.  Thus, general cost of war becomes 
higher than that of abusing states.  See id. at 266. 
 55 “[T]he adoption of a European Convention…was…an affirmation of the belief that government respecting human 
rights are less likely to wage war on their neighbors.”  HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN CONTEXT,  LAW, POLITICS,  M ORALS 786-787 (2d Ed. 2000). 
 56 “L&E identifies additional reasons why states have interests in binding other states to observe humanitarian 
norms in internal conflict. For example, states may experience various types of externalities as a result of human rights 
violations in internal conflicts in other states. First, as ongoing conflicts in Kosovo and the Congo dramatically 
illustrate, internal conflict often produces direct externalities, such as significant refugee problems and the potential 
contagion of armed conflict into neighboring states. Less direct externalities include possible demonstration effects: 
rebellion in one state may encourage rebellion in another and violation of human rights in one state may increase the 
likelihood of violation in another. Finally, citizens in other states might experience moral externalities, in which 
concern for human suffering is perceived as a preference. This preference is satisfied when human rights are respected. 
While some may express theoretical concern about these "derivative" preferences, which relate to the protection of 
others, the important reason why they cannot be dismissed is simply that people act to satisfy them: therefore, a theory 
of rational choice would be incomplete without accommodating derivative preferences.”  Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. 
Trachtman, The Law and Economics of Humanitarian Law Violations in International Conflict, 93 AM.  J. INT’L L. 394, 
404 (April 1999).  See also GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 2, at  109-110. 
 57 To the extent that human rights protection represents public goods, it tends to be under-produced by the market.  
Dunoff & Trachtman, supra note 3, at 16.  However, the under-supply is not the problem of the externality itself, but 
the problem of bargaining-failure between parties.  See generally, David De Meza, Coase theorem, in 1 THE NEW 
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 270 (Peter Newman ed. 1998).   
 58 An externality is economically irrelevant if “the effects [do not] impose enough cost on recipients to cause them 
or others to discover mutually beneficial ways to reduce the harmful effect.”  See Yandle, supra note 11, at 264. 
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externality problems;59 then, the same analysis will be applied in the context of 
international human rights regimes.60  To simplify things, this analysis is based on the 
assumption of legal sovereignty.  A limitation of the analysis under the behavioral 
sovereignty concept will be considered later.  
¶18 In a world where transaction costs are minimal, well-specified definitions of 
property rights will be enough to solve externality problems, because anyone who is 
negatively affected can negotiate with the externality producers.61  Even though 
externalities would still exist, the amount would be voluntarily agreed upon by their 
producers and recipients.62  For example, an airport generates noise to its neighbors, 
which constitutes an externality if the users – airline companies – don’t pay damages to 
the neighbors.  If it is clear that the neighbors have the right not to be disturbed by such 
noise, then the airline company must either stop its business or voluntarily pay money to 
the neighbors to purchase a right to generate noise.  The airline business becomes 
expensive due to this purchase, the number of flights thereby decreases, and thus noises 
decrease as well until it reaches the economically efficient level.  The same level of noise 
can be voluntarily achieved even if airline companies have a right to generate noise.  The 
neighbors must either move into another area, or voluntarily pay airliners to develop 
noise decreasing techniques.  Either way, the total effect of noise will decrease to 
economically efficient levels. 
¶19 An analogous analysis can be made in the context of international relations and 
human rights regimes.  Professors Dunoff and Trachtman suggest the concept of an 
international political market where “like economic markets, the international system is 
formed by the interactions of  . . . states.” 63  The utilitarian states can trade their 
sovereignty for other benefits.64  For example, states trade their own jurisdiction with 
another state through extradition treaties, or states trade their power to control a specific 
part of internal policy for pecuniary or non-pecuniary benefits (e.g. foreign aid or trade 
favors).65 The assets traded in this international political market are “sovereignty” rather 
than goods or services, but this fact does not change the analysis.66  Thus, defining the 
clear scope of legal sovereignty is enough to solve the externality problems created by 
human rights abuses under the market approach.  A state affected by human rights abuses 
in another state can negotiate with the violating state to decrease the level of abuse.  Even 
though human rights abuses cannot be eliminated, they will be reduced voluntarily to an 
economically efficient level.67   
                                                 
 59 See generally, COASE , supra note 9. 
 60 The author assume in this analysis that the externality generated by human rights abuses is economically relevant: 
external effects are great enough to make states trade their resources in return for the abusing state’s sovereignty assets 
of human rights control.  As discussed above, economically irrelevant externalities need not to be resolved.  See 
Yandle, supra note 11, at 264.  
 61 Id. at 270.  
 62 Id. 
 63 See Dunoff & Trachtman, supra note 3, at 13. 
 64 Id.  
 65 Criminal sanctions against individuals for certain crimes through international criminal courts can be also viewed 
as a transfer of state jurisdiction (paying a sovereign cost) to the international institution. 
 66 Professor Abbott defines “sovereignty cost” as the symbolic and material cost of diminished national autonomy.  
A state pays sovereignty costs in exchange for other benefits in the international political market.  See Abbott, supra 
note 32, at 375.  
 67 Zero level abuse is not an economically viable level as well, so we cannot eliminate human rights abuses.   
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¶20 Like the airline hypothetical discussed above, if international law grants exclusive 
sovereignty to a state, then a state can determine its human rights policy and other states 
are not allowed to intervene in such decisions.  Any state that has concerns about human 
rights abuses in foreign states must pay money or give other benefits to the abusing states 
in exchange for the abandonment or change of the abusing policies.  On the other hand, if 
international law grants the negatively affected states a right not to be disturbed by other 
states’ human rights abuses, then the abusing state must either stop its abusive policies or 
pay a price to the affected states in exchange for maintaining them.  Either way, the level 
of human rights abuses will be voluntarily reduced.   
¶21 Under the market approach, protecting and enforcing a property right should be 
guaranteed.68  Otherwise, parties can resort to options other than trade which generally 
result in inefficient distribution. 69  Therefore, war as a form of forceful usurpation, should 
not be allowed.  Just like theft or robbery is not an efficient means of transferring 
properties, neither is war an effective way to distribute sovereignties.70  States must divert 
resources to build their armed forces for offensive or defensive purposes.71  Moreover, 
war generally incurs the cost of value diversion by channeling the asset from the state 
that values it the most to one that may value it less but has greater power.72  Thus, as long 
as the transaction costs are low enough to allow trades of assets in the internationa l 
political market, protecting legal sovereignty, and thus prohibiting war generally, is an 
efficient solution to increase global welfare and to solve the externality problems created 
by human rights abuses. 
¶22 Current human rights sentiments under the UN Charter seem to resonate with a 
market-oriented approach based on the concept of legal sovereignty.  According to the 
UN Charter, a state has an almost absolute right to control its internal matters including 
human rights policies, and other states are not allowed to intervene in such matters.73  
States must rely on peaceful means, such as negotiation, to solve a dispute with other 
states, and disputes with regard to human rights problems are no exception. 74  Unlike the 
self-defense exception, which is important to protect sovereignty rights, the use of force 
for humanitarian causes is not explicitly allowed under the UN Charter without the 
approval of the Security Council.75  Thus, in most cases, a state has to rely on the 
international political market to solve the problems of human rights abuses unless such 
problems amount to extreme humanitarian crises.76  In many cases, human rights 
conditions have actually been improved through negotiation rather than through 
                                                 
 68 The ex-ante remedy of “property rule” in the Calabresi-Melamed model requires strong entitlements.  Such 
entitlements should be protected by harsh rules (e.g. criminal sanctions) to eliminate any incentive to adopt options 
other than trade.  See generally Guido Calabresi & Douglas A. Melamed, Property Rules, Liability, and Inalienability: 
One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. RE V. 1089 (1972). 
 69 Id.  
 70 For an analogous analysis about a theft, see FRIEDMAN, supra note 19, at  567-568.  
 71 Id.   
 72 “[Violence] induces diversion of resources from useful production to struggles over ownership.”  Haddock, supra 
note 16, at 170. 
 73 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7. 
 74 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 3. 
 75 The UN Charter explicitly authorizes the use of force for self-defense in Article 51.  But humanitarian 
intervention in case of human rights crises is permissible only under narrow circumstances.  See U.N. Charter art. 2, 
para. 4. 
 76 For those narrow circumstances that might allow humanitarian intervention, see UN report, supra note 20, at 62-
67. 
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humanitarian intervention.  For example, human rights conditions have been improved in 
South America largely due to monetary and political aid from the United States.77  
Several African countries have also witnessed the improvement of human rights 
conditions through various forms of developmental aid and other political benefits 
provided by developed states.78 
¶23 Therefore, the lack of humanitarian intervention does not necessarily mean that the 
current system is working inefficiently.  To the contrary, the market approach suggests 
that any type of humanitarian intervention should generally not be allowed.79  Otherwise, 
states may resort to war or the forceful usurpation of sovereignty rights, which is 
generally less efficient in distributing resources (i.e. sovereignties) than the market.  Or, 
if one argues that norms are developed to grant the states a right not to be disturbed by 
human rights abuses, then every human rights abuse must have been strongly prohibited.  
But many human rights abuses have gone unpunished, and arguably, rights not to be 
disturbed are not granted to the affected states under the current human rights regime.  
V. MIGHT MAKES A DIFFERENCE. 
¶24 The market approach discussed above has limited applicability.  It assumes that 
international law can enforce sovereignty rights as property, once it clearly defines who is 
entitled to what.  However, loosening such an assumption requires a different frame of 
analysis.80  When parties are not within the same borders, not subject to the same 
application of government force, qualitatively different controversies arise and in such 
controversies, law has less importance.81  In international relations, where self-help is the 
guiding principle, sovereignty rights will be distributed based on the power and interests 
of the states when the right to abuse clashes with the right not to be disturbed.82  
However, this does not mean that international law has no teeth.  Rather, it means that 
international law cannot make a state give up a right that it can protect with its own 
fists.83  State power sets certain limitations in applying a market-oriented approach. 84  
Based upon the economic model developed by Professor Haddock, the following analysis 
                                                 
 77 The decrease in human rights violations in Latin America can be partly attributable to the U.S. policy under the 
Carter administration to deny aid for governments that violated human rights.  See generally Ellen L. Lutz & Kathryn 
Sikkink, International Human Rights Law and Practice in Latin America, 54 INT’ L ORG. 633 (2000).  
 78 For example, human rights violations in Kenya were decreased largely due to the threat to cut off aid by the U.S. 
Congress.  To recover such monetary and political benefits, Kenya had to adopt multiparty elections and the accession 
to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in 1997.  See 
generally Hans Peter Schmitz, Transnational Activism and Political Change in Kenya and Uganda, in THE POWER OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND DOMESTIC CHANGES 39 (Thomas Risse, Steve Ropp & Kathryn Sikkink 
eds., 1999). 
 79 Under the market approach, states shall not intervene with the sovereignty of another state even in the case of 
humanitarian crisis, because the market approach implicitly assumes that negotiation costs are always lower than the 
cost of violence. 
 80 See e.g., David W. Leebron, A Game Theoretic Approach to the Regulation of Foreign Direct Investment and the 
Multinational Corporation, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 305 (1991). 
 81 Id. 
 82 For the economic analysis about how property rights will be distributed when parties rely on violence, see 
generally Haddock, supra note 16, at 168-194. 
 83 For a general analysis about how violence sets a limitation on the ability to contract, see generally Umbeck, supra 
note 17. 
 84 Id. 
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will expand the discussion of how a state’s power can affect the market-oriented 
approach and how the approach should be revised to properly incorporate those limits.  
A. Determination of Behavioral Sovereignty 
¶25 In a hypothetical world, let us assume that there are only two states (A and B) that 
compete for a right to control certain jurisdictions.  The increase of one state’s discretion 
to determine its own human rights policy will intrude upon the other state’s right not to 
be disturbed by such a policy.  If international law entitles a state (A) an absolute 
sovereignty right, then the affected state (B) is not allowed to intervene with respect to 
such a right.  To make the analysis simple, let us assume that as one state claims more of 
such a right, the marginal benefit decreases and the marginal cost to enforce such a claim 
increases.85 
¶26 If A can fully exercise its legal sovereignty right, A has a right to claim a 
jurisdiction on the area from Oa to Ob (see Picture 1).  However, A’s marginal benefit 
and the cost of enforcement indicates that A cannot (or has no reason to) exercise the 
right in full scale, because enforcing rights beyond point “Z” will incur more cost than 
the benefit derived.  Thus, A’s behavioral sovereignty right will be the area between Oa 
and Z.  Let us call this area the unilateral behavioral sovereignty to distinguish it from the 
behavioral sovereignty achieved when one state competes with other states.  
 
¶27 Unilateral behavioral sovereignty implies that even if A wants to provide a full 
measure of human rights protection, it is not economically feasible to do so.  Thus, in an 
                                                 
 85 For the discussion of reasonableness of this assumption, see Haddock, supra note 16, at 176-180. 
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area that A does not control, between Z and Ob for example, human rights abuses can 
persist regardless of A’s human rights policy.  
¶28 In such cases, trading legal sovereignty rights may not be an efficient solution 
because, even if A changes its policy in accordance with B’s request, A has no power to 
enforce such a policy anyway.  In other words, A is conveying zero value sovereignty 
rights in exchange for money paid by B.  Thus, B has no reason to negotiate with A.  
Rather, it would be more efficient for B to intervene in A’s uncontrolled jurisdiction if B 
can more cheaply control such an area.  (Or B can join other states collectively—Kantian 
peace86— in patrolling such jurisdiction through an international institution.) 
¶29 For example, let us assume that the Afghan government fa iled to control a terrorist 
camp within its own borders before the military action of the United States in 2002.87  In 
that case, sanctions would have been ineffective if the Afghan government did not have 
enough resources to control the area in the first place.  Not only would sanctions not have 
helped improve the situation, but monetary aid would also have been inefficient if the 
money could not improve the Afghan government’s control over the area.  In such a case, 
it is not reasonable for the United States to trade with the Afghan government, because 
the conveyed sovereignty would have zero value compared to the money paid.  Thus, 
trade in the international political market would have not been an efficient solution.  
Instead, allowing military intervention would have been efficient if a state that was 
concerned about the area could have improved conditions more cheaply than the 
sovereign state.  
¶30 On the other hand, some states may be able to exercise more rights than those to 
which they are legally entitled.  Even though it is disputable whether international law 
allows more rights than legal sovereignty, we can expect that the sovereignty price of 
powerful states will be more expensive than that of other states. 
¶31 This view can be distinguished from the sovereignty view suggested by Andrew 
Moravcsik.88  Under Moravcsik’s model, sovereignty cost is uniform, and the decision to 
join human rights treaties depends solely on the benefit derived from such treaties.89  
However, under the behavioral sovereignty model discussed above, the price of 
sovereignty varies depending on the power of the states; and decisions to join human 
rights treaties depend both on the sovereignty value surrendered to and the benefits 
derived from such treaties.  The difference in the sovereignty value of each state can 
partly explain why some states with better human rights conditions sometimes refuse to 
join human rights treaties.  With a higher price to pay, some powerful states may refuse 
to join such treaties when the benefit derived is minimal.  
                                                 
 86 John R. Oneal & Bruce Russett, The Kantian Peace: The Pacific Benefits of Democracy, Interdependence, and 
International Organizations, 52 World Politics 1, 1 (1999). 
 87 Even though this assumption is too simplistic to explain the actual situations at that time, this simplification can 
deliver valuable insights which can help in understanding the relationship between behavioral sovereignty and the 
market approach.  
 88 See Andrew Moravcsik, The Origin of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe, 54 
Int’l Org. 217 (2000). 
 89 Id. at 228. 
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B. Determining Bilateral Behavioral Sovereignty under the Zone of Controversy Model. 
¶32 Legal sovereignty is not guaranteed in the real world.90  States have to protect their 
sovereignty with their own forces, and thus “security is often their overriding goal, and 
self-help their guiding principle.”91  Thus, the actual behavioral sovereignty can be much 
less than what a state could afford without any conflict, especially when the right to 
autonomy clashes with another state’s right not to be disturbed. 
¶33 Returning to the hypothetical discussed above, B comes into play to claim the right 
to intervention (exercise of a right not to be disturbed). (See picture 2.)  If A does not 
resist, B can claim jurisdiction on the area between Ob and X.  However, A is able to 
enforce its jurisdiction on the area between Oa and Z, and thus the area between X and Z 
becomes the “zone of controversy”92 in which conflicts over rights/jurisdiction are 
inevitable.  The zone of controversy will be distributed to State A and State B based on 
their power and interest on specific issues.   
 
¶34 The zone of controversy model implies that even powerful states cannot claim the 
whole sovereignty because it becomes more costly to claim additional jurisdiction.  For 
example, it may be easy to temporarily claim jurisdiction over a specific area for specific 
issues, but it becomes harder to claim general sovereignty over the entire country, as 
witnessed in the United State’s war against Iraq.  The more the powerful state (B) claims 
the right to intervene, the weaker it becomes economically, because its marginal cost 
increases while the marginal benefit decreases.  But, the weaker state (A) becomes 
stronger as it loses more, because the state becomes more serious about the encroachment 
                                                 
 90 KRASNER, supra note 29, at 36-42. 
 91 Abbott, supra note 32, at 364. 
 92 Haddock, supra note 16, at 175. 
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of its sovereignty and its power to enforce marginal rights becomes greater.  
Concentrating a state’s power on a small area of jurisdiction is much easier than 
defending every bit of legal sovereignty, while maintaining this power during forceful 
occupation is difficult.  The final distribution of jurisdiction will be made where both 
states’ lost profits are equal, i.e., the point “Y” where the area of triangle ‘ace’ equals the 
area of triangle ‘fbd.’  Thus, the behavioral sovereignty of A decreases from point ‘Z’ to 
point ‘Y.’  Let us call this area the bilateral behavioral sovereignty simply to distinguish 
it from the behavioral sovereignty that can be achieved without any conflict with other 
states.  
¶35 The situation discussed above is not common these days because the cost of 
humanitarian intervention is usually higher than its benefit, considering the general 
abhorrence of military action by the international community.93  Moreover, military 
intervention is costly and much more difficult than defense.  However the model suggests 
that if such intervention involves a lower cost relative to peaceful alternatives, then B will 
infringe on A’s legal sovereignty and compete for the jurisdiction with its own force.94  
For example, military intervention may incur lower costs relative to peaceful means, 
especially if such intervention is short in duration and thus elicits less serious revulsion 
from A or A’s people.  Likewise, B will be willing to fight to take A’s legal sovereignty 
if significant stakes are involved, such as national security concerns, imminent threats to 
its own citizens, or a massive amount of externalities.  Moreover, the model implies that 
B can take away A’s legal sovereignty if B is strong enough to overcome any costs that 
might be incurred during the military actions.95  Whatever the situation is, this model 
shows that the distribution of sovereignty rights will be based on the power and interests 
of competing states in the case of armed conflicts. 
¶36 But, we have to note that “might makes rights is not a claim of a normative 
superiority.”96  Rather, “[i]n fact, it is undesirable when contrasted with an ideal world, as 
it induces diversion of resources from useful production to struggle over ownership.”97  
Negotiation in the international political market also involves costs which must be 
diverted from productive uses.98  If negotiation costs are higher than the cost of violence, 
war will be economically more efficient than the international political market.  “Cost 
cannot be avoided when valuable resources are to be reallocated.  The best that can be 
hoped is for the cost to be minimized.”99  Therefore, “might makes rights” is deficient 
only if it works no better than the competing peaceful alternatives, not because we wish it 
were wrong. 100  
                                                 
 93 War between states is “one of the six clusters of threats with which the world must be concerned now and in the 
decades ahead.”  See UN REPORT, supra note 20, at 2.  
 94 If the threats from human rights abuses are great, and the use of power is proportionate to the threats, 
humanitarian intervention can be justified. See id. at 106.  Moreover, the cost of violence can be reduced by 
establishing the legitimacy of military action.  However, even in such cases, if negotiation is cheaper than violence, a 
state has no reason to rely on its force. 
 95 Such an implication explains the superpower exception. “[S]uperpowers, however, have rarely sought 
Security Council approval for their [military] actions. That all States should seek Security Council 
authorization to use force is not a time honored principle” See id. at 62. 
 96 Haddock, supra note 16, at 170. 
 97 Id.  
 98 Negotiation cost is also a loss to society.  Id. at 169. 
 99 Id. at 176. 
 100 Id.  
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C. Relations of War and Peace: War Caps the Cost of Peaceful Alternatives 
¶37 States generally prefer negotiation over war.101  But, when the negotiation cost 
exceeds the cost of war, it is reasonable that states are willing to take military action to 
enforce their rights, because “whether the resolution would be violent depend[s] upon the 
cost to the parties of narrowing the perceived probability distribution in alternative 
ways.”102  A state’s power can play a significant role in determining whether to rely on 
force or other peaceful alternatives.  Normative factors such as the legitimacy of the 
regime or popular support can have significant effect on the cost of violence, but it is also 
hard to deny that state power is still an important factor in deciding between violence and 
other peaceful alternatives.103  Even though international law mandates that states use 
peaceful alternatives,104 a state will abide by this rule only when the alternatives provide 
greater benefits than violence — a calculus that includes both short- and long-term 
considerations, including various forms of international pressure in support of 
international legal norms.105  Conversely, international law cannot force a state to give up 
a right that it can protect with its own fists.106 
¶38 How do these limitations change our analysis based on the market approach 
discussed above?  These limitations of international law affect the transaction costs of the 
international political market by narrowing the negotiation range of an agreement.  When 
might makes rights, the negotiation cost will not exceed the cost of war.107  The abusing 
state can withhold the trade until the opposing state gives up most of its trade benefits.  
However, if such opportunistic behavior increases the negotiation cost above the cost of 
war, the opposing states will employ military action instead of giving up all of their trade 
benefits by negotiation.  Thus, opening the possibility of using violence up front can 
reduce the transaction costs, as long as the threat of force is credible. 
¶39 The negotiation cost will be relatively low for small and weak states because the 
“hold-out” problem can be alleviated by threats of force from the affected states.  As the 
cost of violence is relatively low against a small and weak state, a small increase in 
transaction costs can make the opposing state turn to violence.  Thus, small states tend to 
make an agreement easily instead of adopting brinksmanship strategy. 108 
                                                 
 101 The number of armed conflicts between states has been stably low since 1945.  See UN REPORT , 
supra  note 20, at 11. 
 102 Haddock, supra note 16, at 175. 
 103 Powerful states will have a lower marginal cost to enforce their rights, while the lack of legitimacy or popular 
support will increase the marginal cost.  See generally id. at 172-176. 
 104 “All Members shall settle their international dispute by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace 
and security, and justice, are not endangered.” U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 3. 
 105 See Umbeck, supra note 17, at 40. 
 106 For example, states often go to ICJ to resolve territorial disputes only when they can accept ICJ’s decision.  If 
they think the stakes are too high and they have enough power to protect their interest with their own force, then they 
will resort to armed force instead of negotiation or third party resolution. 
 107 If the negotiation cost is higher than the cost of war, states will choose violence over negotiation.  
 108 “Brinkmanship is the policy or practice of pushing a dangerous situation to the brink of disaster in 
order to achieve the most advantageous outcome. It occurs in: International politics; Foreign policy; and (in 
contemporary settings) in Military strategy involving the threatened use of nuclear weapons.  This 
maneuver of pushing a situation to the brink succeeds by forcing the opposition to back down and make 
concessions.  This might be achieved through diplomatic maneuvers by creating the impression that one is 
willing to use extreme methods rather than concede. During the Cold War, the threat of nuclear force was 
often used as such an escalating measure.”  Wikipedia, Brinkmanship, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brinksmanship.  
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¶40 However, when powerful states abuse the human rights of their own people, 
successful negotiation is often difficult.109  The opposing states cannot easily use violence 
to enforce their rights not to be disturbed, because war against a powerful state is very 
costly.  With virtually no threat of military action, the abusing state tends to wait until the 
opposing states give up every exchange benefit they expect.  The hold-out problem 
increases the negotiation cost, but not over the cost of violence.  Therefore, abuses tend to 
continue unless the externality generated by human rights abuses is significant enough to 
override such a high cost of negotiation or war.110 
D. The Movement Toward Efficient Use of Violence 
¶41  As discussed above, in a nirvana, protecting the absolute right of sovereignty can 
be an efficient solution for the externality problems generated by human rights abuses.111  
However, in the real world where the transaction costs are not minimal and where 
sovereignty rights are not absolute, it may be inefficient to rely solely on the market.  
Allowing humanitarian intervention is inevitable when the international political market 
does not work, and such a use of force is sometimes more efficient.112  If the use of force 
can be an efficient way to distribute sovereignty assets, why does the international 
community show such strong opposition to the use of force?  One of the answers can be 
found in the opportunistic behaviors that usually accompany military action against other 
states. 
¶42 Human Rights Watch points out problems with opportunistic behavior when it 
reports that “a common concern is that military intervention might become a pretext for 
military adventures in pursuit of ulterior motives.”113  The state that engages in military 
action is not only enforcing its right, but also judging what the damage was and what the 
proper remedy is.  If the attacking state has the option to impose punishment that makes 
itself better off at the expense of the attacked state, it becomes less clear whether the 
attacking state is violating international law or simply trying to alleviate the damages.114 
¶43 Several devices that may decrease such opportunistic behaviors have been 
suggested to reduce the danger of violence while ensuring effective enforcement.115  One 
such device is post-conflict peace-building under UN authority. 116  If a state that employs 
                                                 
 109 For example, the Clinton administration renewed China’s most favored nation status continuously despite the 
record of its human rights abuses.  See David E. Sanger, Support Shrinks for China’s Trade Status, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 
1999, at A19. 
 110 Human rights abuses in Russia or China have been overlooked by the liberal states due to their power and 
importance in international community.  For example, “even though Human Rights Watch brief provides evidence of at 
least three disappearances per week in Chechnya and details new cases of extrajudicial killings, forced disappearance 
and torture”, the United States has largely overlooked Russian human rights practices due to Russia’s important role in 
international society.  Burke-White, supra note 8, at 278. 
 111 Steinberg, supra note 28, at 344. 
 112 In this sense, the doctrine of humanitarian intervention which is seemingly inconsistent with the literal reading of 
the U.N. Charter can serve as a reconciliatory device between the ideal system and real limitations.  “Contemporary 
arguments about the rights of international organizations or groups of states to use force, if necessary, to put an end to 
massive violations of human rights have been justified by reference to this doctrine.”  See THOMAS BUERGENTHAL & 
DINAH SHELTON & DAVID STEWART,  INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN A NUTSHELL 4 (2002). 
 113 Human Rights Watch, World Report 2000, The Critique of Military Intervention, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN CONTEXT,  LAW, POLITICS,  M ORALS, supra note 55, at 659, 659-660.   
 114 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 19, at 275-276.   
 115 See UN REPORT, supra note 20, at 59-74. 
 116 Id. at 70-74. 
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military action is not allowed to control the sovereignty so obtained, the concern of 
opportunistic behavior will be lessened.  If the UN implements peace agreements, 
determines the proper amount of compensation, and rebuilds the communities, the 
maneuvering state will be prohibited from reaping more benefits from military action 
than curing the human rights problems.117  Humanitarian intervention based on regional 
agreements is another effective device, because it is harder for one state to persuade its 
neighbors to take military action for its own cause rather than on behalf of pure human 
rights concerns.118  In addition, such regional enforcement can avoid the problem of 
inaction shown by the Security Council.119  These two suggestions are separate in the 
sense that one deals with the question of how to transfer the autonomy (discretion) of the 
abusing states, while the other focuses on the question of how to enforce the autonomy 
already so obtained.  But, those suggestions serve the same purpose – the reduction of 
opportunistic behavior.   
¶44 Even when there are no opportunistic behavior problems, the use of force should 
still be avoided.  Violence often leads to another type of violence, thus generally 
impairing the stability of the global society. 120 
“Inter-state [war] in [one] region fuels and exacerbates internal wars, 
making them more difficult to bring to a close.  Such rivalry, by 
promoting conventional weapons build-ups, diverts scarce resources that 
could be used to reduce poverty, improve health and increase 
education.”121 
¶45 As a state that abuses its own people generates externalities against other states, so 
does a state that prefers violence over negotiation. 
¶46 How can we reconcile these two oxymoronic positions regarding the use of force: 
one encouraging it as the effective enforcement mechanism in international society, and 
the other discouraging the use of force as the source of externalities endangering world 
peace?  The answer suggested by the market approach discussed above is allowing 
military action only when the international political market fails.  It seems that current 
international law resonates with such a conclusion.  Human Rights Watch advocates 
nonconsensual military intervention only when it is the last feasible option to avoid 
genocide or comparable mass slaughter.122  The “force as a last resort” rule is also 
recognized by United Nations.123 
¶47 War is not an efficient method of distributing sovereignty assets when negotiation 
is available because war generally incurs a value diversion and encourages early 
consumption of resources rather than productive investment.124  However, a state may 
adopt violence to reap additional benefits other than alleviating human rights conditions, 
                                                 
 117 For the role of peacekeepers, see UN REPORT, supra note 20, at 70. 
 118 Regional or sub-regional missions are suggested as possible alternatives for collective enforcement under the UN 
authority. See Davis, supra note 45, at 19-21. 
 119 See Rosalyn Higgins, Peace and Security Achievements and Failures , 6 EUR. J. IN T’L L. 445 (1995). 
 120 UN REPORT, supra note 20, at 31. 
 121 Id. 
 122 Human Rights Watch, supra note 113.  
 123 UN Report, supra note 20, at 66. 
 124 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 19, at 567-568.  See also Haddock, supra note 16, at 170.     
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even when the improvement of these conditions can be negotiated with an abusing state 
in the international political market.  Therefore, the market approach based on private 
enforcement implies that violence should be prohibited except when the problem of 
opportunistic behavior is minimal and negotiation in the international political market is 
difficult.  Current international law seems to be consistent with this conclusion.  The 
general guideline of “use force only when the market fails,” supported by regional 
agreement and post-conflict control under UN authority, will ease the movement toward 
an efficient use of violence from the current inability to react against human rights crises. 
VI. HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES : PROPERTIZING HUMAN RIGHTS CONTROL. 
¶48 Current human rights treaties bestow rights on individuals, not on states.125  These 
treaties seem to divert from the “Westphalian” notion of the state as the principle actor in 
international politics.126  However, as states pool their authority to define the proper level 
of human rights protection, one can argue that the Wesphalian notion of the state is not 
totally ignored in current human rights treaties.  With pooled sovereignties, the 
international community, not an individual state, defines specifically what each state 
should do to protect human rights.  Even though the rights are bestowed on individuals, 
the state is the entity that must surrender its sovereignty assets.  Thus, states are still the 
principal actors, defining, trading, and pooling their sovereignty assets in the international 
political market.127 
¶49 Interestingly, enforcement clauses are rarely included in such covenants.128  This 
lack of enforcement can be justified, however, if these treaties are devices to stimulate the 
international political market by making human rights control a tradable property.  Such a 
property right is protected not by the global government but by the state’s own power.  
The focus is on clarifying the definition of the violation and the scope of human rights, 
because clarity can reduce transaction costs in the international political market.129 
¶50 States that fail to sign a treaty are sorted out so that other states can easily identify 
who the primary negotiating parties are.  States that have already signed the treaty are 
generally required to submit reports regarding their human rights conditions,130 and these 
reports again help narrow down the number of potential negotiating parties among the 
ratifying states.  By clarifying the identity of the negotiating parties and the scope of the 
                                                 
 125 “The idea of human rights is used to affirm that all individuals, solely by virtue of being human, have moral 
rights which no society or state should deny.” DAVID SIDORSKY, Contemporary Reinterpretations of the Concept of 
Human Rights , in ESSAYS ON HUMAN RIGHTS 89 (1979). 
 126 “In the Westphalian system, the interests and goals of nation-states were widely assumed to transcend those of 
any individual citizen or even any ruler.”  Wikipedia, Westphalian sovereignty, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Westphalian_sovereignty.   
 127 Dunoff & Trachtman, supra note 3, at 13-14. 
 128 As Louis Henkin explains, the principal element of horizontal enforcement is missing in human rights treaties.  
A state cannot legally respond to other states’ violations of treaties by retaliation or the threat of retaliation.  Louis 
Henkin, International Law: Politics, Values and Functions, 216 COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACAD. OF INT’L L. 
13, 251 (Vol. 4, 1989). 
 129 For example, if we can define clearly who is violating what kind of human rights, the affected states may at least 
know with whom they should negotiate.  If it is not clear who is violating what, then a negotiation option cannot even 
be pursued.  
 130 Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (hereinafter ICCPR) for example, the States 
Parties have to submit reports on the measures taken to improve human rights conditions, and all those submitted 
reports must be presented to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.  ICCPR, art.40, paras 1-2. 
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violations, international human rights covenants have helped reduce transaction costs in 
the international political market.  Thus, due to those treaties, a state can buy human 
rights control in other states more cheaply using the international political market.  
¶51 Professors Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner argue that modern human rights treaties 
have not significantly affected the level of human rights protection, because accession or 
ratification of these treaties have no correlation with the degree of respect for human 
rights covered by them.131  Two empirical studies show that there is no statistically 
meaningful relationship between the accession of treaties and the degree of human rights 
conditions.132  As Goldsmith and Posner correctly point out, “liberal states that object to 
human rights abuses and are willing to devote resources to ending them do not 
distinguish between human rights abusers that have ratified human rights treaties and 
those that have not.”133  However, Goldsmith and Posner wrongfully conclude that there 
should be some positive relationship between ratification and human rights conditions in 
order for modern human rights treaties to be effective.134  On the contrary, the market 
approach implies that no such relationship is required to prove the efficiency of modern 
human rights treaties. 
¶52 The goal of the modern treaties is decreasing the transaction costs.  As discussed 
above, accession and ratification are ways to decrease the transaction costs by 
distinguishing potential negotiating parties.  The liberal states’ primary focus must be on 
those states that failed to ratify the treaties, and states that ratified human rights treaties 
might have evaded the attention of liberal states unless they have been constantly 
reported as notorious human rights abusers.  Therefore, a positive relationship between 
ratification and human rights conditions may not be found even though modern human 
rights treaties are effective in decreasing the level of human rights abuses in non-ratifying 
states.  Rather, there should be a negative relationship if the overt human rights abusers 
among ratifying states are excluded from the analysis.135  As Professor Oona Hathaway 
shows, states that ratify treaties sometimes experience a diminution in the pressure for 
real improvements in human rights practices, because the main focus of negotiation shifts 
from those states to non-ratifying states.136  This analysis also explains why mere “truth-
telling” can be an effective device in improving human rights conditions.137  Truth-telling 
facilitates trade in the international political market by identifying potential negotiating 
parties. 
¶53 The same analysis can be applied to the Inter-American model.  The Inter-
American Commission’s function of “in loco” visits, where the Commission talks with 
                                                 
 131 GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 2, at 121-122. 
 132 For the empirical analysis, see Linda Camp Keith, The United Nations International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights: Does It Make a Difference in Human Rights Behavior?, 36 J. PEACE RES. 95 (1999); Oona Hathaway, 
Do Human Rights Treaties Makes a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935 (2002). 
 133 GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 2, at 121. 
 134 Id. 
 135 The empirical study by Hathaway finds a negative relationship between ratification and human rights conditions 
in some cases.  “[C]ountries with poor human rights ratings are sometimes more likely to have ratified the relevant 
treaties than are countries with better ratings, a finding that is largely unexplained by either the normative or the 
rationalist theories.”  Hathaway, supra note 132, at 1978. 
 136 See id. at 2006-2009. 
 137 “Those who argue that international norms are transforming sovereignty – including many proponents of 
international criminal law – must recognize that some states still prefer domestic to international approaches and ‘truth 
telling’ and reconciliation to prosecution. The Truth Commission in South Africa, with its broad amnesty powers, is the 
best example.”  Abbott, supra note 32, at 373. 
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governments about human rights abuses, and its disclosure of reports on its members’ 
human rights conditions have served as a negotiating tool. 138  Lack of cooperation among 
states and lack of financial resources make meaningful enforcement unlikely, even if a 
member’s violations of human rights treaties are reported to the General Assembly. 139  
However, the Inter-American model has worked as a procedural system for clarifying the 
dispute and facilitating negotiation in the international political market.  Most of the 
improvement of human rights conditions has been achieved through bilateral negotiations 
led by the powerful hegemon, the United States.140 
¶54 In sum, the above analysis shows that current human rights treaties play two 
important roles in the international political market.  First, human rights treaties provide 
well-specified definitions of legal sovereignty with respect to human rights control and 
thus facilitate trades of sovereignty assets in the international political market.  Second, 
human rights treaties decrease transaction costs by identifying potential negotiating 
parties through the ratification and reporting process.  The reduction in negotiation costs 
will make violence more expensive relative to trade in the international political market.  
By propertizing human rights control in the international political market, current human 
rights treaties have contributed to the efficient distribution of sovereignty assets, thus 
improving human rights conditions even without collective enforcement.   
VII. MARKET APPROACH V. INSTITUTIONALIZATION. 
¶55 Some scholars criticize current human rights treaties as being enforced only 
selectively against small and weak states, arguing that this selectivity hurts the legitimacy 
of international human rights treaties.141  Others argue that some treaties are no t even 
enforced at all, thus establishing only norms rather than laws.142  These scholars even 
conclude that international human rights law is simply a myth if not backed up by 
institutionalized enforcement.143  Both points are legitimate, but as explained earlier, they 
do not necessarily lead to the conclusion that current international human rights treaties 
are inefficient.  
¶56 Will it be more efficient to institutionalize international human rights regulatory 
bodies to increase the level of enforcement?  Could such a movement increase the level 
of human rights protection in general?  To answer such questions, we have to review the 
potential benefits and costs of the institutionalization.  Only when the benefit of 
institutionalization exceeds the cost, should the institutionalization be justified.  
                                                 
 138 The Inter-American commission viewed itself more as a political organization that focuses on communicating 
gross violations of human rights among its members.  Cecilia Medina, The Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights and The Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Reflections on a Joint Venture, 12 Hum. Rts. Q. 439, 440 
(1990), in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT, LAW, POLITICS, M ORALS, supra note 55, at 872.  
 139 Id. at 874. 
 140 See Lutz & Sikkink, supra note 77. 
 141 One of the common arguments is that the double standard in human rights policy can undermine the legitimacy 
of human rights norms.  See Julie A. Mertus, Bait and Switch? Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy, FOREIGN 
POLICY IN FOCUS REPORT (Mar. 2004), ht tp://www.fpif.org/papers/2004rights.html (last visited at Nov. 03, 2006). 
 142 Rationalists often argue that international law is not actually a binding law, but an efficient norm.  See Dunoff & 
Trachtman, supra note 3, at 51-52.  CLS theorists even argue that the lack of enforcement in current human rights 
regimes only excuses violations rather than prevents or remedies them.  See David Kennedy, The International Human 
Rights Movement: Part of the Problem?, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 99, 199 (2002).  
 143 See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 2, at 119-126. 
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¶57 Potential benefits of institutionalization include the lower cost of defining human 
rights abuses, the lower cost of defending state autonomy, and the economy of scale 
achieved by monopolization. 144  First, the costs of defining what constitutes a human 
rights abuse decrease when a monopolized judicial body decides the meaning of 
covenants without negotiation. 145  Any developing issues can be resolved more cheaply 
through a single judicial body.  Moreover, a monopolized judicial body makes the 
liability rule available, and ex ante definitions of human rights can be sometimes 
avoided.146 
¶58 Second, institutionalization can decrease enforcement costs by monopolizing the 
force.147  Threat becomes more credible while the actual use of force becomes less 
common. 148  Moreover, the legal sovereignty rights of states are guaranteed under the 
institutionalized system, so a state’s cost of defense decreases as well.  The saved cost in 
armed force will enable member states to spend more resources on the improvement of 
human rights, and thus institutionalized enforcement of human rights treaties become 
cheaper to achieve. 
¶59 Third, states may enjoy economies of scale.149  The potential gains from economies 
of scale are twofold.150  With a single institutionalized body, states can avert the risk of 
evasion, detrimental regulatory competition, and other unjustified judicial 
inconsistenc ies.151  Coordinated rule-making, surveillance, and enforcement activities can 
provide additional efficiency that cannot be achieved without institutionalization. 152  
Second, there may be technological economies of scale, relating to specialized 
organization. 153  For example, with a significant learning curve achieved through 
monopolization, the European Court of Human Rights is now maintaining its reputation 
as the most reliable human rights court in the world,154 and a large volume of case law has 
been developed to clarify the meaning of the European Conventions.155 
¶60 The European model of institutionalization has been widely acclaimed as the “most 
advanced and effective” international human rights regime in the world today.156  In fact, 
the European model has been very successful, although it has not been perfect, in 
implementing and enforcing human rights.157  However, if one argues that every human 
rights convention should follow the European model based on the benefits mentioned 
above, he is committing a nirvana fallacy. 158  The market approach is not always less 
                                                 
 144 The costs involved in centralizing the authority to define rights and enforce them are discussed in detail by 
Professor McChesney.  See McChesney, supra note 13, at 227-253. 
 145 Id. at 229-231 
 146 The liability rule requires extensive institutionalization or tribunals for assessing damages, and compulsory 
jurisdiction to enforce such a remedy.  See Dunoff & Trachtman, supra note 3, at 25-26. 
 147 McChesney, supra note 13, at 231-232 
 148 Haddock, supra note 16, at 171. 
 149 Dunoff & Trachtman, supra note 3, at 15-17. 
 150 Id. 
 151 Id. 
 152 Id. 
 153 Id. 
 154 STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 55, at 786. 
 155 Id. 
 156 See Andrew Moravcsik, supra note 88, at,243.  
 157 Id.  
 158 See Harold Demsetz, supra note 25.  
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efficient when we consider both the benefits and the costs of institutionalization. 159  The 
possible costs of institutionalization include the high initial cost in developing the agreed-
upon institution itself, the cost of running such an institution, the increase in information 
costs, rent-seeking behavior, and agency costs.160 
¶61 The member states of the European Convention share a similarity in state 
preferences.161  Member states have adopted similar political systems based on 
democracy and have relatively concentrated wealth distribution among states.162  In 
addition, they share similar cultural heritage and traditions.163  Forming an initial 
agreement is less expensive when parties have similar preferences.164  In addition, 
geographical concent ration reduces the agency costs involved in institutionalization.165  
Moreover, as the economic block increases mutual transactions, each member becomes 
more “asset specific” to the other member states.166  Therefore, the initial cost of 
institutionalization was less expensive for the European region compared to other regions 
in the world.  Without such social and political conditions that the European Convention 
shared among its member states, institutionalization can be a disaster, suffering from 
huge amounts of negotiation costs and rent seeking behavior.  
¶62 Rent-seeking costs exist because a state will spend resources to influence the 
transnational standards in order to make them as close as possible to its current domestic 
regulations.167  If the international rules are exactly the same as the domestic rules of a 
certain state, then that state is practically giving up nothing by such institutionalization.  
As having initial rights close to its domestic regulation decreases the cost of commitment, 
states will spend resources to influence the political process to get a favorable initial 
assignment of rights. 168  For example, let us assume that we have adopted a human rights 
treaty that allows the right to polygamy.169  Western states would have to pay a huge 
                                                 
 159 Concededly, market approach and institutionalization cannot be dichotomized.  However, for the simplification 
of analysis, the degree of institutionalization will not be discussed in this Note. 
 160 For an analogous discussion about costs of government as definer of rights, see McChesney, supra note 13, at 
238-249.  
 161 “The Preamble of the European Convention refers…to the ‘European countries which are likeminded and have a 
common heritage of political traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of law’”, STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 55, at 
787. 
 162 The convergence of GDP per capita among EU members had occurred before the Maastricht Treaty created the 
European Union.  See Ville Kaitila, Convergence of Real GDP per capita in the EU15, How Do The Accession 
Countries Fit In? (EUR. NETWORK OF ECON. POLICY RESEARCH INST., Working Paper No.25, Jan. 2004), available at 
http://www.enepri.org/Publications/WP025.pdf. 
 163 STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 55, at 787.  
 164 Group homogeneity can decrease the cost of monitoring agent, thus decreasing the cost of enforcing the 
agreement.  See Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill, The Evolution of Property Rights, in PROPERTY RIGHTS, 
COOPERATION, CONFLICT, AND LAW, supra note 11, at 118, 136. 
 165 As the geographic size of the collective unit becomes larger, it becomes more costly to enforce the agreement.  
See id. 
 166 Higher asset specificity often leads to a higher incentive to form institution, because the value as a group is much 
greater than the stand alone value.  Dunoff & Trachtman, supra note 3, at 39-43. 
 167 The cost of commitment depends on the degree of divergence of a state’s practice from the requirements of the 
treaty.  See Oona A. Hathaway, The Cost of Commitment, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1821, 1833 (2003). 
 168 “Having the initial rights assigned favorably not only confers a valuable resource, but the rights bestow the 
ability to realize additional exchange value when higher-value users appear.”  See McChesney, supra note 13, at 239-
240.  
 169 “In social anthropology, polygamy is the practice of marriage to more than one spouse simultaneously (as 
opposed to monogamy where each person has only one spouse at a time).”  Wikipedia, Polygamy, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polygamy. 
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political cost to conform to such a treaty, while Arab nations that have already 
maintained such practices would suffer less difficulty. 170  Moreover, such Arab nations 
would be in a better position for future negotiations with regard to other human rights 
issues due to this initial savings of resources.  It is conceivable that the European human 
rights model has suffered fewer rent seeking problems because each member state had 
already adopted similar rules regarding domestic human rights.  But, one can expect that 
when the domestic systems and rules of laws are diverse among member states, the rent-
seeking behavior can be so extreme as to render institutionalization unlikely. 
¶63 Moreover, institutionalization requires that member states contribute sufficient 
political and economic resources to run the monopolized system.171  First, member states 
must surrender a part of sovereignty that has positive value.  As discussed above, it is of 
no use to transfer a legal sovereignty which a state cannot exercise with its own power 
anyway.  If a lot of member states are politically unstable and maintain a minimal value 
of legal sovereignty, institutionalization would be unfeasible.   
¶64 Contributing part of the autonomy of each member state is necessary, but may not 
be sufficient for institutionalization because running a monopolized system necessarily 
consumes economic resources.  Running a transnational body is not a free option.  For 
example, the African Commission is still suffering from a lack of resources and thus 
cannot handle all the human rights violations.172  Therefore, unless the accumulated 
wealth of the states involved is enough to run the institution, simply adopting the 
European model may be neither feasible nor efficient. 
¶65 Information cost is another factor to consider.173  Detailed information of a state’s 
real concern about human rights abuses (i.e. the amount of actual externality) may not be 
known to the independent human rights tribunal.  Information is naturally costly even for 
states, but negotiating states in the international political market can keep the fruit of the 
negotiation while the institution often cannot.174  Overall, the incentive to procure the 
requisite information is likely to be greater for interested states.175  This is more so when 
the interest is combined with a political purpose other than pure human rights concerns.176  
A state can exaggerate its concerns about human rights violations in other states and a 
court may uphold such a position even when it is not economically efficient.  Conversely, 
the violating state may underplay the effect of its abusing policy and argue that such a 
policy is inevitable.  The fact that the information is costly and the independent tribunal 
has less incentive to find out the actual stakes for each state may lead to the inefficient 
distribution of resources – the over- or under-enforcement of human rights.  
¶66 Finally, agency cost can be significant.177  An angelic theory of human rights 
institutions may guarantee the optimal amount of enforcement with objective evaluations.  
                                                 
 170 “In Islam a man is allowed to be married to four women at one time, given that he can support them equally in 
every way. Muslim polygamy, in practice and law, differs greatly throughout the Islamic world.”  Id.  
 171 Institutions can allocate sovereignty only after they have ownership of it.  See McChesney, supra note 13, at 235. 
 172 Chidi Anselm Odinkalu, The Individual Complaints Procedures of the African Commission on Human And 
People’s Rights: A Preliminary Assessment, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT, LAW, POLITICS, M ORALS, 
supra note 55, at 928-929. 
 173 For general discussions of information cost, see McChesney, supra note 13, at 239. 
 174 See id. 
 175 See id. 
 176 Opportunistic behavior problems can be dire when a state wants to use human rights treaties as a political tool to 
achieve different goals.  
 177 See McChesney, supra note 13, at 240.  
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However, a human theory of human rights institution will often involve judges and staff 
who care more about their self- interest than the ideal notion of human rights.178  They 
may have less incentive to care about the optimal configuration of human rights and more 
incentive to care about the interest of their own states or their own careers.  An institution 
can determine human rights issues inefficiently due to the political pressure, or 
sometimes an institution can even abuse its power over individual states.179  Thus, 
especially when a region is politically unstable and opportunistic behaviors are common, 
it is reasonable for states to oppose to a monopolized enforcing body, because each state 
can be the very victim of such an institution.  With monopolized power, the institution is 
often the very abuser of state’s rights.180  For example, in the Inter-American system, 
member states show an ambivalent attitude toward the increase of the power of Inter-
American Court of Human Rights.181  States might worry that as the institution becomes 
stronger, it may threaten their own autonomy or even worse, their own existence.  In such 
circumstance, institutionalization may no longer an efficient option.  
¶67 As the costs and benefits differ depending on the circumstances, a system that 
works efficiently in one area does not necessarily perform to the same degree of 
efficiency in another area.  Thus, considering the benefits and costs in certain social and 
political contexts is important before considering institutionalization as an alternative to 
market approach. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
¶68  We may not have to be too skeptical about the effectiveness of current human 
rights regimes.  Even though the lack of enforcement is often regarded as a problem, it 
does not necessarily lead to the lack of efficiency of current human rights treaties.  
Rather, those treaties have been under undue criticism which they may not deserve.   By 
facilitating the trade of human rights control in the international political market, those 
treaties have played an important role in improving human rights conditions even without 
collective enforcement.   
¶69 The market analysis of human rights treaties implies that the default rule should be 
against any type of war, because the property rule can distribute the sovereignty asset (i.e. 
human rights control) more efficiently than violence.  But, the self-help nature of 
international relations also implies that a few revisions of the market approach are 
required.  First, the distribution of sovereignty assets would be based on behavioral 
sovereignty rather than legal sovereignty, because unenforceable sovereignty will not be 
traded in the international political market.  Second, the use of force should be allowed as 
an efficient method of distribution, but only when the international political market is not 
available and opportunistic behavior problems regarding use of force can be avoided.  
Current international law adopting a “force as a last resort” rule supported by other 
devices that can reduce opportunistic behaviors (for example, post-conflict control under 
                                                 
 178 The fallacy of the publicly interested government can be applied here as well.  David D. Haddock, Sizing Up 
Sovereigns: Federal Systems, Their Origins, Their Decline, Their Prospects , in ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM 1-21 
(Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill. Lanham, MD eds., 1997).   
 179 See generally McChesney , supra note 13, at 241-249 
 180 Government is often the biggest threat to private citizens.  See Haddock, supra note 16, at 186-87.  Likewise, if 
the transnational body is too powerful, it can become a threat to each member state and its people.  
 181 STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 55, at 869. 
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UN authority or military intervention under regional agreement) can be an economically 
efficient solution for human rights problems generating a significant amount of 
externality. 
¶70 Finally, institutionalization of human rights enforcement can be considered as a 
possible alternative — or a supplement – to the market approach, but such 
institutionalization must be pursued only when the benefit derived from it exceeds the 
cost.  Institutionalization has benefits, but is not costless.  Thus, ideally rhetoric favoring 
institutionalization should not be disregarded, but be scrutinized. 
